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Most Anglo-American companies’ stocks are publicly held by a large number of 
shareholders, which leads to a highly dispersed ownership structure. However, 
something is different for most companies in developing countries because their 
stocks are usually concentrated in a single controlling shareholder or several large 
shareholders. Classical principal-agent theory was born in America, provides us a 
really effective tool to analyze agency problems between company owners and 
managers. Although it helps a lot to explain problems in most Anglo-American 
companies, it is not very applicable to companies whose ownership is highly 
concentrated. Continuous scandals that ultimate controlling shareholder appropriates 
the benefits of companies through “tunneling” behaviors in recent years arouse 
scholars’ interest to study conflicts between the ultimate controlling shareholders and 
the minority shareholders. The ultimate controlling shareholders can get an excess 
control rights through indirect holding ways like pyramids structure , cross-holdings 
and so on. 
When control rights is separated from cash flow rights, the ultimate controlling 
shareholders may have strong incentives to obtain private benefits through their 
control rights and bear just a little loss because they owns a relatively low percent of 
cash flow rights. The ultimate controlling shareholder have strong incentives to make 
decisions for private benefits rather than for the development of the company, and it 
leads to a decline of the company’s financial performance. This paper is based on the 
principal-agent theory and private benefits of control theory. we select 698 public 
listed family firms in the A-share market as a sample, using panel data regression 
methods to test how the separation between voting rights and cash flow rights impacts 
the company's financial performance. We find that separation of voting rights and 
cash flow rights showed a significant negative correlation relationship with company's 
financial performance. A high degree of deviation is harmful to enhance the financial 
performance of the company. In addition, we examines the influence of ultimate 
















shows that cash flow rights are significantly positive correlated with company's 
financial performance, indicating that the “incentive effects” exists when the ultimate 
controlling shareholder has a high proportion of cash flow rights. 
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第一章  绪论 
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① La Porta, Lopez-de-silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W.Vishny,法与金融学研究领域“四剑客”,因经常一起





































严重程度。La Porta et al.（1999）构造了两权分离系数，提供了易于实施且有说


































推理。在此基础上，本文又利用面板数据的固定效应模型对 2010-2014 年 5 年间
家族类上市公司的数据进行了回归分析，得出了更加可靠的结论。 
1.3 本文的贡献与不足 
      本文可能的贡献在以下几个方面： 

























































第二章  文献综述 
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2014 年 9 月发布的报告，截至 2014 年 7 月底，A 股 2528 家上市公司中有 1485




















































2.2 国外两权分离相关研究文献  
在 La Porta 等人开始他们的经典研究之前，大多数学者认为世界上所有国家
的公司是同质的，因此他们沿用委托-代理理论的分析框架分析各个国家公司的
问题。后来的研究表明，不是所有国家公司的股权结构都像欧美国家那样分散，
实际上，股权相对集中才是西欧和东亚各国公司的常态。La Porta et al.（1999）
最早通过层层追溯的方法寻找公司的终极所有权人和控制权人，这一崭新的研究
方法让学者们眼前一亮：涉及到一系列代理问题的研究时，终极控制人可能是比
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